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It is often supposed that one of the goods delivered by successful science is the 
right way of classifying the things in the world.  Surely there is something right about 
this: any body of scientific knowledge will include ways of classifying, and will not serve 
its intended aims unless the classifications it embodies reflect real differences and 
similarities in the world.  The standard paradigm for such a successful scientific 
classification is the periodic table of the elements. 
But there is also much potentially wrong with the supposition just mentioned.  
Most importantly, there is a highly questionable implication of there being some uniquely 
best classification.  Classifications are good or bad for particular purposes, and different 
purposes will motivate different classifications.  It may be that there is such an ideal 
classification for chemistry, but if so it is because of the specific aims implicit in the 
history of that discipline.  Chemistry aims at the structural analysis of matter and if, as 
appears to be the case, all matter is composed of a small number of structural elements, a 
classification based on those elements will be best suited to these purposes.  It is also 
often the case that chemical structure will be the best guide to the properties of kinds of 
matter.  But not necessarily.  Two quite distinct chemicals are referred to as ‘jade’ and 
despite some serious debates on the issue, Chinese jade carvers have decided that both 
are real jade (LaPorte   ). 
This illustrates the general point, which becomes much more obvious when we 
move from chemistry to biology, that classifications devised for different goals can be 
cross-cutting and overlapping (Dupré, 1993, part1).  There remains among many 
biologists and philosophers the hope of finding the ultimate and uniquely best 
classification of organisms, most recently conceived in terms of the speciation processes 
of Darwinian evolution (e.g., De Queiroz, 1999).  However, it is at the same time 
becoming clearer that there is very likely no such ideal classification.  There is no reason 
why a classification that reflects the origins of the things classified should coincide 
exactly with one aimed at the ecological relations of those things, and it is increasingly 
perceived that these can and do diverge (Dupré, 2002, chs. 3-4).  This possibility 
becomes even clearer in view of the difficulties that are emerging in the project of 
evolutionary-based classification.  Speciation was once seen as an all or nothing affair 
leading to complete isolation of one group form another.  It is now clear that for micro-
organisms, in particular, there is very little such isolation, and genetic material moves in 
many ways from one kind of organism to another.  In fact it has become common to 
conceive of the genome of an ecosystem (the soil of an area, or a body of water) rather 
than the privatised genome of an individual organism (see e.g. Venter et al., 2004).  The 
classical picture of speciation applies quite well to some of the most complex multi-
celled organisms, such as mammals and birds, though much less well to plants.  An 
important movement in biology is to transcend the anthropocentrism that takes the 
peculiarities of our own corner of the living world as the model for all. 
The recognition that even within science there is no objectively given 
classificatory order allows the realisation that there is nothing inherently inferior about 
the biological classifications developed by non-scientific folk for non-scientific purposes.  
This point has been obscured for philosophers by the highly influential proposal by 
Hilary Putnam (1975) that ordinary language terms for naturally occurring kinds of thing 
or stuff were primitive attempts to refer to the kinds that science would eventually 
delineate more accurately.  My own view is that science is generally quite unable to do 
this, and that ordinary language terms are generally just fine as they are for the purposes 
fore which they have been developed (Dupré, 2002, chs. 1-2). 
A graphic illustration of what I have in mind here can be gained from reflection 
on the wisdom taught to all young children that science has discovered that whales are 
not fish.  No doubt this wisdom long antedates Putnam’s proposal, and shows that such 
intuitions about the achievements of science are widespread.  Nonetheless it is very 
difficult to provide a convincing rationale for the ‘discovery’ that whales are not fish.  
‘Whale’ in ordinary language refers to all the members of one branch of the family 
Cetacea (the Baleen whales) and the larger members of the other branch (the toothed 
whales).  The smaller members of the latter group, dolphins and porpoises, are not 
generally referred to as whales.  Large cetacean is not a concept that has any great 
biological significance.  ‘Fish’ is much worse.  Even assuming it doesn’t encompass 
shellfish or jellyfish, there are three groups of aquatic vertebrates generally thought of as 
fish, but groups that have diverged for hundreds of millions of years.  In fact a lungfish, 
being part of the aquatic lineage from which terrestrial vertebrates evolved, is more 
closely related by descent to a whale (or, for that matter, a human) than it is to a salmon 
or tuna.  In short, since these are not significant scientific terms it is impossible to see 
how science can have discovered facts about their reference. 
A final problem with scientific classification raised by the formulation with which 
this note began, is that ‘things’ are often distinguishable only after classification, rather 
than presenting themselves to be classified in full-fledged thinginess.  So for example it is 
obvious to common sense that a tree is an individual thing.  But from one biological 
perspective a copse of elm trees, all suckers from the same root system, should be seen as 
a single individual.  A more interesting example is the recent development of the concept 
of a gene.  The more science finds out about the workings of DNA inside living cells, the 
harder it is to find principled ways of dividing the DNA into components suitable for 
classification into anything related to the historical meaning of ‘gene’ (Moss, 2001, Stotz 
Griffiths, and Knight, 2004; Dupré 2004).  Of course this is not normally a problem for 
molecular biologists in the context of their professional lives, but it can lead to serious 
misunderstanding of many things they say. 
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